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General SESource: nypost.comOctober 29, 2026

Intelligence Probe Highlights Compute Intermediary Vectors Surrounding Nvidia Supply Chain

US intelligence surveillance has linked Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang to an alleged Chinese intelligence operative managing Megaspeed, a Singaporean cloud provider under investigation for routing compute resources to Chinese entities. The inquiry highlights operational vectors where unsanctioned domestic subsidiaries of blacklisted server manufacturers act as intermediary procurement pipelines for restricted hardware.

Surveillance Findings and Intermediary Sourcing

Classified US intelligence findings indicate that electronic surveillance identified Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang as a contact of Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), an executive at Megaspeed. US intelligence agencies concluded that Alice Huang was covertly transmitting information to Beijing while maintaining commercial interactions with tech executives. Documented encounters include meetings in Taipei in June 2024 and May 2025. The intelligence assessment yielded no evidence that Jensen Huang had knowledge of the alleged intelligence-gathering activities, nor did it clarify the specific technical value or scope of the data transferred.

Megaspeed, a Singapore-based cloud partner, provides high-performance AI computing capacity to Chinese commercial entities, including Alibaba. Federal authorities are evaluating whether Megaspeed functioned as a middleman to bypass US export controls prohibiting the direct sale of advanced accelerator hardware to Chinese organizations.

Topology of Sanctions Circumvention

The procurement path used by Megaspeed relies on structural gaps in US trade restrictions. Megaspeed acquired Nvidia hardware through the US-based subsidiary of Inspur, a major Chinese server manufacturer. Washington previously placed Inspur’s parent company on an entity blacklist due to links with the Chinese military; however, Inspur's US subsidiary remained free of federal sanctions.

By purchasing hardware through this unsanctioned US entity, Megaspeed populated its Southeast Asian data centers with high-density compute nodes. Megaspeed subsequently deployed a infrastructure-as-a-service model, leasing remote compute capacity to mainland Chinese firms to bypass hardware import limits.

Corporate Mitigations and Political Context

Nvidia rejected assertions that customer engagements with Megaspeed posed operational or national security risks. A company representative stated that regional cloud service providers receive standard commercial telemetry and ordering information rather than trade secrets or hardware architecture documentation. Nvidia also stated that prior claims regarding illegal hardware diversion through Megaspeed were investigated and debunked, adding that the company routinely responds to federal notices concerning flagged counterparties.

The regulatory environment remains complicated by broader trade policy considerations. Federal officials were briefed on the intelligence findings approximately a year prior, but the administration declined to take action to avoid disrupting semiconductor supply chains. Nvidia has maintained high-level access to policymakers while pledging $500 billion in domestic manufacturing investments and lobbying for adjusted controls on international hardware sales. Chinese diplomatic representatives denied the surveillance claims, stating China's technology sector relies on independent innovation.

Read the original article at nypost.com.