EU Age Verification Specification Faces Backlash Over Google Play Integrity and Apple App Attest Dependencies
A technical dispute in the European digital identity wallet repository highlights critical flaws in a proposal to require Google Play Integrity and Apple App Attest. System architects argue that these proprietary dependencies break interoperability standards, enforce vendor lock-in, and undermine digital sovereignty.
Dependency Concerns in State-Level Identity Systems
A critical architectural conflict has emerged within the `eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technical-specification` repository under Discussion #19. The draft technical specification for the European age verification system lists "App and device verification based on Google Play Integrity API and Apple App Attestation" as a baseline requirement. Systems engineers and open-source contributors are urging the immediate abandonment of this plan, arguing that hardcoding dependencies on proprietary APIs controlled by non-European technology firms compromises the system's foundational security and operational model.
The primary critique centers on the loss of digital sovereignty. Integrating Google Play Integrity and Apple App Attest binds the verification layer directly to Google Mobile Services (GMS) and iOS ecosystems. This dependency effectively locks out alternative operating systems, custom Android distributions, and de-Googled devices, violating the system's own design principles of being controlled by users and made available to anyone who wants to use it.
Standards-Based Alternatives and Existing Implementations
Opponents of the current draft argue that proprietary vendor verification APIs are structurally unnecessary to prove application and platform integrity. As proof of concept, contributors point to Yivi (formerly IRMA), a decentralized identity application used in the Netherlands for age verification. Yivi operates successfully without dependencies on proprietary remote attestation services and is distributed on open-source repositories like F-Droid.
On a system level, engineers point out that standard Android hardware attestation APIs can verify the integrity of the device, operating system, and application signature without enforcing GMS licensing. This architecture has been proposed in related issues, specifically `eudi-app-android-wallet-ui#287` and `eudi-app-android-wallet-ui#390`, which advocate using standard hardware-backed keystores rather than proprietary Google endpoints to evaluate trust.
System Architecture and Regulatory Contradictions
The proposed integration of Google Play Integrity directly conflicts with the specification's stated interoperability design principle, which mandates seamless integration across diverse device operating systems, wallet applications, and online services. By coupling trust chain validation to Google and Apple's proprietary attestation infrastructure, the system introduces external points of failure.
Furthermore, contributors highlight a stark contradiction between European regulatory actions and the technical specifications drafted by its agencies. While the European Commission actively sanctions Google for anti-competitive behaviors and dominant market positioning, this specification enforces a monopoly by requiring proprietary Google toolsets. To bypass native application runtime integrity constraints altogether, some developers suggest migrating the architecture to a modern web application leveraging the Digital Credentials API.